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Declarants: Sections 90.803(23) and
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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 16, 1999, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality of the hearsay exception for elderly persons or disabled
adults, Florida Statutes section 90.803(24)(1995).' The case began in
October of 1995 when the State of Florida charged the defendant, David
R. Conner, with armed burglary of a dwelling, armed robbery, and
armed kidnapping. 2 The victim, Earl Ford, was an 84-year old man who
lived alone.3 He suffered from poor eyesight, some hearing loss, and
occasional memory lapses.4 David Conner broke into Earl Ford's home,
tied him to a chair with his suspenders, and ransacked the house.5 Con-
ner then robbed Ford at gunpoint for money and several other items.6
The next day, Ford provided an initial statement to the police;7 two
weeks later, he gave them a sworn statement.8 However, three months
later, Ford died. Prior to trial, the State of Florida provided Conner with
notice that it intended to introduce Ford's hearsay evidence at trial. The
State relied on section 90.803(24), the hearsay exception that makes
admissible out-of-court statements made by elderly persons or disabled
adults.9 Conner challenged the hearsay exception as facially violative of
1. Conner v. State of Florida, 748 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1999).
2. Id. at 952.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Conner v. State of Florida, 709 So. 2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Conner, 748 So. 2d at 952.
9. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24) (1995).
(a) Unless the source of information or the method or circumstances by which
the statement is reported indicates a lack of trustworthiness, an out-of-court
statement made by an elderly person or disabled adult, as defined in s. 825.101,
describing any act of abuse or neglect, any act of exploitation, the offense of battery
or aggravated battery or assault or aggravated assault or sexual battery, or any other
violent act on the declarant elderly person or disabled adult, not otherwise
admissible, is admissible in evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding if:
1. The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the
time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of
reliability. In making its determination, the court may consider the mental and
physical age and maturity of the elderly person or disabled adult, the nature and
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both his right to confront witnesses and to due process under the Florida
and U.S. constitutions. 'I The trial court ruled that the State would have
to establish that the circumstances surrounding the statements guaran-
teed their reliability before the court would admit them at trial."I As a
result, Conner pleaded nolo contendre and specifically preserved the
right to appeal the issue of the constitutionality of the hearsay excep-
tion.12 On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida held
that the elderly hearsay exception is not facially void under either the
confrontation clause or the due process provisions of both the federal
and state constitutions. 13  Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 4 Although the Court declined to reach the constitu-
tionality of 90.803(24) as it applies to disabled adults, it concluded that
the exception with regards to elderly persons violates the defendant's
constitutional rights of confrontation.' 5 The court came to this conclu-
sion only after thoroughly comparing section 90.803(24) with section
90.803(23), the hearsay exception with regards to child declarants.
Thus, on appeal, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the Second Dis-
trict's decision and held that the hearsay exception for elderly adults in
criminal cases is unconstitutional because it cannot justify the abroga-
tion of a defendant's most basic constitutional right: the right to confront
witnesses.
duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the victim to the offender, the
reliability of the assertion, the reliability of the elderly person or disabled adult, and
any other factor deemed appropriate; and
2. The elderly person or disabled adult either:
a. Testifies; or
b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided that there is corroborative evidence of the
abuse or offense. Unavailability shall include a finding by the court that the elderly
person's or disabled adult's participation in the trial or proceeding would result in a
substantial likelihood of severe emotional, mental, or physical harm, in addition to
findings pursuant to s. 90.804(1).
(b) In a criminal action, the defendant shall be notified no later than 10 days before
the trial that a statement which qualifies as a hearsay exception pursuant to this
subsection will be offered as evidence at trial. The notice shall include a written
statement of the content of the elderly person's or disabled adult's statement, the
time at which the statement was made, the circumstances surrounding the statement
which indicate its reliability, and such other particulars as necessary to provide full
disclosure of the statement.
(c) The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the basis for
its ruling under this subsection.
Id.
10. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, VI; FLA. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 9, 16.
11. Conner, 748 So. 2d at 953.
12. Id. at 953-54.
13. Conner, 709 So. 2d at 170.
14. Conner, 748 So. 2d at 952.
15. Id. at 954.
[Vol. 55:309
NARROWING THE GAP
1I. PERSPECTIVE
A. Analysis of Section 90.803(24), the Hearsay Exception for
Statements of Elderly Persons
In 1995, the Florida Legislature enacted Florida Statutes section
90.803(24) which addressed hearsay statements of elderly persons and
disabled adults. At the same time, the legislature also enacted section
825.101, which provided definitions of "elderly person" and "disabled
adult."16 In Conner v. State of Florida,17 the Supreme Court of Florida
declined to reach the constitutionality of section 90.803(24) as it applies
to disabled adults because that issue was not presented in the case.
18
Instead, the parties and the court only concentrated on the exception as it
pertains to elderly persons.
There are two components to the definition of an "elderly person,"
as defined by section 825.101.19 First, an individual must be at least
sixty years old and "suffering from the infirmities of aging as manifested
by advanced age or organic brain damage, or other physical, mental, or
emotional dysfunctioning. '"20 Second, "the ability of the person to pro-
vide adequately for his own care or protection is impaired."21 Only once
it is established that the declarant is an elderly person, as defined by the
statute, is this hearsay exception, section 90.803(24), appropriately
available for use. Ford certainly satisfies the first component of the defi-
nition, as evidenced by his advanced age, poor eyesight, hearing loss,
and occasional memory lapses. Thus, it appears that Ford suffered from
the infirmities of aging as manifested by these symptoms of old age.
Ford's disabilities fall squarely within the physical and mental dysfunc-
tioning provisions of the statute.
However, the statute indicates that a person is defined as an "eld-
erly person" only if his dysfunctions inhibit his ability to provide ade-
quately for his own care or protection.22 The definition's very language
implies that being "elderly" is contingent on one's inability to indepen-
dently care for himself in an "adequate" manner.23 Thus, the fact that
Ford lived alone and cared for himself may suggest that his "dysfunc-
tioning" did not impair his ability to provide for himself. If the defini-
16. Ch. 95-158, §§ 1, 2 at 1587-89, Laws of Fla.
17. Conner v. State of Florida, 748 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1999).
18. Id. at 961 n.il.
19. FLA. STAT. § 825.101 (1999).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The statute fails to clearly define the term "adequately." Thus, on its face, this provision
seems vague as it fails to carefully delineate examples in which a person's self care and protection
are not adequate, nor does it give examples of borderline adequacy. See id.
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tion is read literally, it is likely that a court would not consider Ford to
be elderly. As a consequence, he would not be granted protection by the
hearsay provision and would have been forced to testify in court.24 The
statute's requirement that an elderly person be unable to adequately care
for himself is vague and leaves room for various interpretations.
According to what or by whose definition of adequacy is one required to
live? If Conner had decided to challenge whether Ford satisfied this
vague part of the definition, he would have a valid argument. Neverthe-
less, Conner did not challenge the use of section 90.803(24) on these
grounds.
More generally, however, Conner argued that elderly persons are
per se incompetent to testify, and that admitting an elderly person's out-
of-court statements violated his right to confront that witness.25 He
asserted that the same age-related infirmities which allow individuals to
be considered "elderly persons" renders that very person unreliable and
untrustworthy.26 In its decision, the Second District Court of Appeals
refuted this argument and stated that the limitations which impair an
elderly person's ability to protect or care for himself have nothing to do
with the victim's ability to provide a reliable statement.27 In fact, that
court declared, "to the extent that the infirmities of age-loss of sight,
hearing, memory, or other abilities-adversely affect the elderly per-
son's ability to discern what happened or to describe the events, those
issues can be explored when the trial court receives evidence.., of the
statement[' s] . . . reliability. '2 8 The court suggested that although the
infirmities which render a person "elderly" may implicate a statement's
reliability, a process exists which would remove any doubts as to a state-
ment's trustworthiness.
Notwithstanding the lower courts' positions, the Supreme Court of
Florida agreed with Conner's argument, and stated that "the circum-
stances that might necessitate the use of the statement-such as the
mental infirmity or physical infirmity of the elderly person-would be
the very circumstances that would render the statement less reliable. 29
This remark fails to recognize that the statute allows for the exclusion of
24. This argument is inconclusive, as Ford's death would have prevented him from testifying
in court, regardless of whether or not he was considered an "elderly person" according to the
statute.
25. Conner, 709 So. 2d at 171-72. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
26. Conner, 709 So. 2d. at 171.
27. Id. at 172.
28. Id.
29. Conner, 748 So. 2d at 955. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24) provides for a hearing outside the
presence of the jury in which the court finds whether the time, content, and circumstances of the
statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability. § 90.803(24) (1995).
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certain types of statements. A court would not admit the statements of a
mentally incompetent person because the statute requires the court to
find that the statement has safeguards of reliability.3" This threshold
requirement will allow a court to exclude those statements that lack
guarantees of trustworthiness. Furthermore, in this assertion, the court
indicates that an elderly person's physical infirmity may render the state-
ment less reliable. 31 This allegation makes no sense whatsoever. Con-
sider the following example: an elderly person is wheelchair-dependent
or bedridden for life. Do these infirmities dictate one's competence to
make a reliable and trustworthy statement? Although it is clear that, in
some circumstances, the statements of a mentally infirm person would
be less reliable than those of a mentally sound person, the same rationale
does not apply in the case of a physically disabled elderly person. Nev-
ertheless, the Florida Supreme Court concludes that a defendant's right
to confront an elderly victim outweighs the importance of protecting the
elderly person from testifying in court and again facing the alleged
victimizer.
Pursuant to the hearsay exceptions in section 90.803, the availabil-
ity of the declarant is immaterial.32 Thus, regardless of whether the
declarant is available to testify, the out-of-court statement will be admit-
ted because it is determined that the statement is sufficiently reliable.
However, in section 90.803(24) of the Florida statutes, the court must
make a finding that the elderly person is deemed unavailable because
"participation in the trial or proceeding would result in a substantial like-
lihood of severe emotional, mental, or physical harm."33 In its decision,
the Second District Court of Appeals included a policy reason in support
of finding an elderly person unavailable: the hearsay exception is
designed "to insure that elderly victims will not suffer injustice at the
hands of the legal system."34 Conner argues that protecting the elderly
runs counter to his right to face witnesses against him.35
The Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as the Florida Evidence
Code, provides that every person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided in the rules, so long as he has personal knowledge of
the matter at hand.36 In addition, the witness's testimony must be ration-
ally based on his perception.37 According to these rules, an elderly per-
30. § 90.803(24)(a)(1).
31. Conner, 748 So. 2d at 959.
32. § 90.803 (1999).
33. § 90.803(24)(a)(2)(b) (1995).
34. Conner, 709 So. 2d at 171.
35. Id.
36. FED. R. EvID. 601, 602; § 90.601 (1995).
37. FED. R. EvID. 701.
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son would be competent to testify if it can be shown that he has personal
knowledge of the relevant facts. However, Conner argues that the eld-
erly are incompetent to testify because the very definition of "elderly
person" requires that one suffer from the infirmities of aging as mani-
fested by advanced age or organic brain damage, or other physical,
mental, or emotional dysfunctioning.38 Conner asserted that these same
dysfunctions would likely impair the ability of the witness to rationally
base his testimony on personal knowledge.39
Notwithstanding this argument, once a court establishes that a
declarant is an elderly person and is unavailable to testify due to the
substantial likelihood that it would result in severe emotional, mental, or
physical harm, the threshold issues of competency and unavailability
have been met. In order to admit the statement into evidence, the court
must find that it indicates a level of trustworthiness.4" To do so, the
court must conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury to deter-
mine whether the time, content, and circumstances of the statement pro-
vide sufficient safeguards of reliability.41 Thus, in making this
determination, the court utilizes a "totality of circumstances" approach
to analyze the declarant's statement.42 Furthermore, when the state
seeks to admit hearsay evidence, it must show the reliability of the state-
ment based on its "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 43
According to the statute, the court may look at certain factors dur-
ing the process of determining whether or not a statement is sufficiently
reliable to admit as hearsay evidence. The factors are: the mental and
physical age and maturity of the elderly person; the nature and duration
of the abuse or offense; the relationship of the victim to the offender; the
reliability of the assertion; the reliability of the elderly person; and any
other factor deemed appropriate. 44 The court can thus consider any fac-
tor it finds relevant in making its determination, and the court makes a
"case-specific" finding of reliability. It appears that the court will not
admit a statement by an elderly person if it finds that the person lacked
the mental capacity for competence, or that the assertion is not reliable
due to that person's specific circumstances. This "case-specific" inquiry
appears to aid the defendant because, absent a finding of reliability, the
38. Conner, 709 So. 2d at 171-72; see also FLA. STAT. § 825.101(6) (1995).
39. Initial Brief of Petitioner on the Merits at 15, Conner v. State of Florida, 748 So. 2d 950
(Fla. 1999).
40. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24) (1995).
41. FLA STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)(1) (1999).
42. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990).
43. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
44. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)(1) (1999).
45. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(c) (1999).
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statement will be excluded. In fact, these guidelines are mere recom-
mendations. A court may use as many or as few as it wishes, but a
hearing must take place to make these determinations.
Although on its face it appears that this suggested list of factors
would assist the court in its determination of the reliability and trustwor-
thiness of an out-of-court statement, the very language of the statute may
suggest otherwise. The court is required to conduct a hearing, but what
takes place in the hearing is not regulated by the statute.46 Again, the
factors listed in the statute are mere suggestions and discretionary. As
Conner argued in his appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, the jury,
not the judge, should determine the reliability of a statement through
cross-examination, judging the demeanor of the witness, and deciding
how much weight to give his statement.47 The statute states that the trial
court may consider the listed factors in making its determination as to
whether the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient safeguards of reliability.48 This failure to command the court
to consider these factors may result in arbitrary decision-making by
courts. Without a required list of factors to consider, this area of the law
runs the risk of being inconsistent. The result may abrogate a defen-
dant's right to confront a witness by admitting the hearsay statement, yet
favor another defendant by excluding the hearsay statement.
Conner suggested that "[a]mending the ... hearsay statute to man-
date consideration of an elderly person's or a disabled adult's physical
and mental infirmities, together with other factors deemed appropriate
would provide sufficient 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness'
or 'safeguards of reliability' as to be so trustworthy and reliable that
adversarial testing would add little."49 Therefore, he argues that the stat-
ute is unconstitutional on its face. Supporting this argument is the fact
that the Supreme Court of Florida has set forth a permissive list of addi-
tional factors that would assist the courts in determining the reliability of
child hearsay statements in addition to those already enumerated in sec-
tion 90.803(23) (the hearsay exception for statements of child victims).5 0
The exception for statements of elderly persons tracks the exception for
statements of child victims.5 I Despite these similarities, the court was
unable to formulate a comparable list of permissible considerations
which would ensure the reliability of hearsay statements made by elderly
46. § 90.803(24)(a)(1).
47. Initial Brief of Petitioner at 24.
48. § 90.803(24)(a)(1) (emphasis added).
49. Initial Brief of Petitioner at 26.
50. Conner, 748 So. 2d at 958; State of Florida v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949, 957-58 (Fla.
1994).
51. Conner, 748 So. 2d at 958.
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adults to the same extent that it does for statements made by children.52
Conner's argument ultimately prevailed when the Supreme Court of
Florida determined that the hearsay exception for elderly persons, sec-
tion 90.803(24), was unconstitutional.
Once a court finds that an out-of-court statement has particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness and the requisite safeguards of reliability,
it is still not admitted into evidence until there is proof of corroborating
evidence of the abuse or offense. 3 Such evidence of the offense must
be independent of the evidence used in determining the statement's reli-
ability.54 The court may not bootstrap the corroborating evidence onto
that which is admitted as hearsay. 55 In the dicta of the Second District
Court of Appeals' decision, the court stated that to "assure that a defen-
dant is not convicted solely on the basis of hearsay statements of an
unavailable witness, the statute provides that, after determining that the
hearsay statement is reliable and originates from a trustworthy source,
the trial court must then find that other evidence corroborates the state-
ment."56 That court misstated the final word of the statute. 'The court's
duty is not to find corroboration of the statement, but of the abuse or
offense.57 This distinction is extremely important because it requires
that the state provide other sources of information in support of the alle-
gations of abuse or offense, in addition to the reliable hearsay statement.
Although the Second District did not specifically rule on the constitu-
tionality of the statute, the exception was upheld largely due to the fact
that the trial court closely followed the statute's guidelines. Among
other reasons in support of this judgment, the court found "other cor-
roborating evidence to support the victim's statement."58 The court
refers to the condition of Ford's house after the incident, and the recov-
ery of the telephone which had been taken from his home as evidence
supporting the hearsay statement.59 However, these facts actually exist
as corroborating evidence of the offense.
As previously stated, an elderly person need not testify in court if
52. Id. at 958-59.
53. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)(2)(b)(1999).
54. Initial Brief of Petitioner at 18. Such evidence includes the time, content, and
circumstances of the declarant's statements.
55. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 823 (1990). The use of corroborating evidence to support
a hearsay statement's 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' would permit admission of a
presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at
trial, a result we think at odds with the requirement that hearsay evidence admitted under the
Confrontation Clause be so trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant would be of
marginal utility. Id. at 823.
56. Conner, 709 So. 2d at 172.
57. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)(2)(b) (1995) (emphasis added).
58. Conner, 709 So. 2d at 172.
59. Id.
[Vol. 55:309
NARROWING THE GAP
participating in the trial or proceeding would result in a substantial like-
lihood of severe emotional, mental, or physical harm.6 ° If such harm
exists, the court would find the declarant unavailable.6' In Conner, the
declarant, Ford, was "unavailable" to testify due to his death. Florida
statute section 90.804(1)(d) states that when the declarant "[i]s unable to
be present or to testify at the hearing because of death he is unavailable
as a witness. 62 Thus, Ford was excluded from testifying. Nevertheless,
because no subsection of 90.804 applied to the statements in question, it
was inapplicable. Although it may seem appropriate for Ford's hearsay
statements to have been admitted pursuant to section 90.804, "declarant
unavailable," the types of hearsay permitted under that statute do not
include statements describing acts of abuse or violence on the elderly
person.63 In other words, there is no similar "death" provision under
section 90.803 that exists under section 90.804 for determining unavaila-
bility of a declarant.
The court would be more inclined to protect an elderly living
declarant if testifying in court would be a harmful experience to that
individual.' On its face, this requirement is easily satisfied by a mere
showing that the elderly person would be physically burdened by testify-
ing in court, or that facing the defendant would cause emotional or
mental harm. In reality, however, the language of the statute is careful
not to be over inclusive, and it specifically states that a finding of
unavailability would be possible only if there is a substantial likelihood
of severe harm to the defendant. 65 Although Conner argues that the stat-
ute is facially void, this provision is clear. Moreover, the statute is not
overbroad. Should the court fail to find a substantial likelihood of harm,
the declarant would be "available" and consequently required to
testify.66
In addition to these "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,"
the statute includes a notice provision which, if followed, abrogates
neither the defendant's right to confront witnesses nor to due process.
67
60. § 90.803(24)(a)(2)(b) (1999).
61. Id.
62. FLA. STAT § 90.804 (1995).
63. § 90.804(2) admits as hearsay evidence the following: (a) former testimony, (b) statement
under belief of impending death, (c) statement against interest, (d) statement of personal or family
history. Ford's statements do not fall within any of the above categories, and thus, § 90.803(24) is
the correct statute to look to in order to admit his statements. § 90.804(2).
64. § 90.803(24)(a)(2)(b).
65. § 90.803(a)(2)(b).
66. Id.
67. § 90.803(24)(b). In a criminal action, the defendant shall be notified no later than 10 days
before the trial that a statement which qualifies as a hearsay exception pursuant to this subsection
will be offered as evidence at trial. The notice shall include a written statement of the content of
the elderly person's or disabled adult's statement, the time at which the statement was made, the
2001]
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The statute provides for a ten-day warning to the defendant so that he
may prepare a defense to counter the admission of additional evidence
against him.68 This seems reasonable, and, in fact, ten days is a substan-
tial amount of time. Moreover, the notice given the defendant includes
the court's findings as to the reliability and circumstances of the state.69
Therefore, the defendant is provided with all relevant facts with which
he may challenge the reliability of the statements at issue. In criminal
trials,7" the jury must base a conviction on a high burden of proof. If the
defense can show any reasonable doubt as to the hearsay statement's
reliability, the defendant may have a greater likelihood of success in
excluding the out-of-court statement.7 The notice provision provides
fundamental fairness to the defendant because it vitiates any possible
unfair advantage to the side submitting the hearsay evidence.
Therefore, the hearsay exception regarding statements made by eld-
erly victims of abuse or violence does not appear unconstitutional.
There are many requirements which must be met before an out-of-court
statement is admitted under this exception. First, the statement's propo-
nent must prove that the declarant is elderly.72 Second, the statement
must contain indica of trustworthiness and provide sufficient safeguards
of reliability.73 The statute even includes a non-exclusive list of factors
that the court may consider in this determination.74 Third, the court
must find corroborative evidence of the abuse or violent offense.75
Fourth, the court must find that the witness is unavailable to testify
either due to the strictures of section 90.804 or because there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that testifying would be harmful to the declarant.76
Lastly, the defendant in a criminal action must receive ten days' notice
that the statement will be used as evidence against him. 77 Without first
meeting these requirements, an out-of-court statement will not be
admitted.
In spite of the many threshold requirements, the Florida Supreme
Court still held this hearsay exception unconstitutional because it vio-
circumstances surrounding the statement which indicate its reliability, and such other particulars
as necessary to provide full disclosure of the statement. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The notice provision only applies in criminal actions. Id.
71. In fact, if one juror finds that the statement lacks reliability, he may weigh this against all
other evidence, and may find that the prosecution's case lacks merit. According to the unanimity
requirement this may result in a victory for the defense. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a).
72. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24) (1999); § 825.101(5) (1995).
73. § 90.803(24)(a).
74. Id.
75. § 90.803(24)(a)(2)(b).
76. § 90.804.
77. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(b) (1997).
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lates the defendant's right of confrontation.78 Since the Court was una-
ble to formulate a permissive list of factors to assist in determining the
reliability of a statement made by an elderly person, the court reasoned
that the exception did not ensure the reliability of the statements admit-
ted at trial.79 As a result, statements such as these would benefit from
adversarial testing in order to guarantee their trustworthiness and relia-
bility.80 In Ford's case, however, no adversarial testing is possible. His
statements, and the statements of others similarly situated, are forever
excluded as a result of this decision. The court's message is clear-
although an injustice was committed against Ford, a vulnerable and eld-
erly man who lived alone-his alleged victimizer will remain free
because the court found that Conner's rights are more valuable than Mr.
Ford's.
B. Defendant's Attack of Section 90.803(24)
In declaring section 90.803(24) unconstitutional, the Florida
Supreme Court reasoned that the exception is not supported by the same
competing policy interests which are present in the child abuse con-
text.8' The child hearsay exception was enacted in "response to the need
to establish special protections for child victims in the judicial sys-
tem."'82 Specifically, the state has an interest in protecting the child vic-
tim of abuse from the further trauma that would be caused by forcing
him to testify in court. 83 Furthermore, the child's out-of-court state-
ments may be more trustworthy than in-court testimony due to the
"stress and trauma of rehashing bad memories, hostile attacks on the
child's credibility, [and] facing the alleged perpetrator again." 84
Despite these arguments, in Idaho v. Wright,85 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the admission of a child's hearsay statements violated
the Confrontation Clause rights of the child's mother.86 This holding is
similar to that in Conner. Wright involved the conviction of a mother on
two counts of lewd conduct with her own children, aged five and a half
and two and a half.87 The lower court admitted hearsay statements made
78. Conner, 748 So. 2d at 960.
79. Id. at 954-55.
80. Id. at 960.
81. Id. at 959.
82. State v. Jones, 625 So. 2d 821, 825 (Fla. 1993).
83. Gladening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212, 217 (Fla. 1988).
84. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs v. M.B., 701 So. 2d 1155, 1158 n.4 (Fla. 1997).
85. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
86. Id. at 813.
87. Id. at 808. Specifically, the mother and her companion (Robert Giles) had committed
sexual acts upon the mother's two children. The youngest daughter was the child of Giles. The
older daughter told her father's female companion that Giles had sexual intercourse with her while
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by the younger daughter to her pediatrician about the abuse, holding that
the child was incapable of communicating to the jury. 88 The Supreme
Court of Idaho held, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, that the
child's statements lacked particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
because the doctor had failed to conduct the discussion with the child
using appropriate procedural safeguards.89 The Court stated that incrim-
inating statements are not admissible unless the statements bear ade-
quate indicia of reliability. 9° The reliability requirement is met either
when the statement falls within a firmly-rooted hearsay exception or has
the essential "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."'"
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states that the
accused shall enjoy the right to confront the witnesses against him.92
However, the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the admission of
all hearsay statements, as evidenced by the many exceptions to the hear-
say rule in both federal and state law. Thus, the Supreme Court has
limited its interpretation of the Confrontation Clause stating that
"[w]hile a literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause could bar the
use of any out-of-court statements when the declarant is unavailable, this
Court has rejected that view as 'unintended and too extreme.' ,'9 The
hearsay exception allows some evidence to be admitted even though the
evidence may be incriminating, and the defendant is not given the
opportunity to face the declarant. The Supreme Court has rejected a
literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause that would completely
prevent any hearsay testimony from being introduced in a criminal
trial.94
Although the out-of-court statements in Wright were not admitted
at trial, not all hearsay statements are excluded. A court must take a
case-specific approach in determining whether or not to allow hearsay
statements to be admitted. As stated in Wright, if a statement falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or has the essential "particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness" the statement will be admitted. 95
The purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to protect a defendant's
her mother held her down and covered her mouth and that she had seen the same thing be done to
her younger sister. Id. at 809.
88. Id. At the time of trial, the child was three years old. Id.
89. Id. at 812-13. He failed to videotape the interview, asked leading questions, and had a
preconceived idea of what the child should be disclosing. Id.
90. Id. at 816.
91. Id. at 816-17.
92. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. See also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(a) (stating that the accused
shall have the right to confront at trial adverse witnesses).
93. Bourjaily v. U.S., 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1980).
94. Conner, 748 So. 2d at 956.
95. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990).
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due process rights by allowing the defendant to defend himself against
the accusations confronting him.96 The rights to confront and cross-
examine witnesses and to call witnesses on one's behalf are essential to
due process and implicit in one's constitutional rights. 97 Furthermore,
the right of cross-examination assures the "accuracy of the truth-deter-
mining process."98 For example, in Chambers v. Mississippi,99 the
Supreme Court held that the defendant was deprived a fair trial when he
was denied the right to cross-examine his own witness."° Similarly, in
Coy v. Iowa, °' that Court held that the Confrontation Clause provides a
criminal defendant the right to confront, face-to-face, adverse witnesses,
and the placement of a screen between the defendant and child sexual
assault victims violated that right. 10 2  Nevertheless, "the right to con-
front and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases,
bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial
process."1"3
The purpose of the Confrontation Clause is deeply rooted in U.S.
legal history. In 1895, in Mattox v. U.S.,' °4 the Supreme Court held that:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to
prevent depositions or ex party affidavits,. . ., being used against the
prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of
the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of test-
ing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of
compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they
may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the
manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
97. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273
(1948)).
98. Id. at 295 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)).
99. Id.
100. Id. Defendant was arrested for murder, and another person (McDonald) made, but later
repudiated, a written confession. On three separate occasions, each time to a different friend,
McDonald orally admitted to the killing. Defendant was nonetheless convicted of the murder.
The state failed to call McDonald as a witness, and the defendant thus called him. Under
Mississippi's common-law 'voucher' rule, a party may not impeach his own witness and the
defendant was prevented from exploring the circumstances of McDonald's three prior oral
confessions. The defendant was deprived of the right to contradict testimony that was clearly
"adverse." id. at 284.
101. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
102. Id. at 1020-22. The facts of this case are as follows: appellant was charged with sexually
assaulting two thirteen-year old girls, and was convicted of two counts of lascivious acts with a
child. The appellant was arrested in August 1985 for the assault of two girls who were camping
out in the backyard of the house next door to him. He allegedly entered the tent after they were
asleep wearing a stocking over his head, shined a flashlight in their eyes, and warned them not to
look at him. Id. at 1014.
103. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295 (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972)).
104. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
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belief.' 0 5
Despite this objective, the Court still noted instances in which public
policy and the necessities of a case overcome these general rules of
law. 06 An example is when the declarant is unavailable to testify due to
death, such as in Conner v. State of Florida, where Ford's death pre-
vented him from testifying. Therefore, the supreme court reasoned that
[t]o say that a criminal, . . . should go scot free simply because death
has closed the mouth of that witness, would be carrying his constitu-
tional protection to an unwarrantable extent. The law, in its wisdom,
declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in
order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused.' 07
Consequently, the Confrontation Clause allows the admission of
hearsay statements in narrow circumstances despite the defendant's
inability to confront the declarant at trial.0 8 Absent these narrow cir-
cumstances, however, confrontation still acts to ensure the reliability of
the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to adversary
testing before the jury."'
The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of the right of con-
frontation. In fact, in California v. Green,"o the Supreme Court gave
three reasons in support of the right of confrontation.' This threefold
purpose is that confrontation:
1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath-thus
impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding
against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; 2) forces the
witness to submit to cross-examination, the 'greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth'; 3) permits the jury that is to
decide the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in
making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his
credibility.' 12
Unlike the requirement that a witness must acknowledge by oath or
affirmation the obligation to testify truthfully,' ' 3 hearsay evidence is
usually unsworn. The oath requirement is a legal obligation to tell the
105. Id. at 242-43.
106. Id. at 243.
107. Id.
108. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). "[T]he right to confront accusatory witnesses
may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such
confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the testimony's
reliability is otherwise assured." Id. at 837.
109. Id. at 845.
110. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
111. Id. at 158.
112. Id.
113. FED. R. EvID. 603.
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truth." 4 The rule is designed to subject the witness to the penalties of
perjury and to indicate the importance of truthful testimony.' 5 The Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence state that the "oath or affirmation [be] adminis-
tered in a form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and
impress the witness' mind with the duty" to testify truthfully." 6 In addi-
tion, if a witness refused to make an oath or affirmation, the rule
requires that the witness be deemed incompetent to testify." 7 Thus,
hearsay statements are generally deemed inadmissible, and the "lack of
an oath or affirmation heightens the judge's doubts about the reliability
of the statement."' 18
Nevertheless, the numerous hearsay exceptions' 19 readily admit
out-of-court statements that have an inference of reliability due to the
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement. 120 In cases such
as these, the oath is no longer required based on the theory that hearsay
evidence may be more reliable than any testimony that the declarant
would give on the stand, and the circumstances of the statement suggest
the declarant's sincerity. 12
The predominant explanation in support of excluding hearsay state-
ments is that admitting hearsay denies the defendant the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. 2 2 In Pointer v. Texas,123 the Supreme
Court extended the right granted by the Confrontation Clause to defend-
ants in state, as well as in federal, criminal proceedings. Section 16(a)
of the Florida Constitution indicates that the accused shall have the right
to confront adverse witnesses at trial via cross-examination. 24 Cross-
examination, coined "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the dis-
covery of truth,"'125 is the "principal means by which the believability of
a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested."'' 26 Without cross-
examination of a witness, no adversarial testing is imposed upon the
hearsay statements that put their reliability into question.
The third purpose of confrontation is to allow the jury to observe a
witness and judge his demeanor in order to assess his credibility. As
114. RONALD L. CARLSON, et al., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE
AND STATUTES 135 (4th ed. 1997).
115. Id.
116. FED. R. EvID. 603.
117. CARLSON, supra note 114, at 135.
118. See id. at 437 (citing 5 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1362, 1373-77 (3d ed. 1940)).
119. FED. R. EVID. 803, 804.
120. CARLSON, supra note 114, at 489.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 437.
123. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
124. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(a).
125. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 WIGMORE § 1367).
126. CARLSON, supra note 114, at 867.
20011
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
previously cited in Mattox, the Court stated the importance "of compel-
ling [the witness] to stand face to face with the jury in order that they
may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the
manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
belief."' 27 A jury may find it helpful to observe the witness in order to
ascertain whether or not that person is telling the truth. If a witness
perspires on the stand, fidgets, or appears to be nervous, a jury may tend
to question that person's truthfulness. The admission of out-of-court
statements prevents the jury from making certain relevant assumptions
about the witness's reliability because the declarant is not on the stand.
Despite the importance of judging a witness's demeanor, hearsay state-
ments that are admitted are permitted because they are just as reliable as
any in-court testimony, if not more so.
It would seem that each time an individual is denied his right of
confrontation, the fundamental right to face a witness and to be able to
ensure the reliability of that person's statement is violated. However,
the admission of hearsay statements does not always abrogate this right.
Although the Supreme Court, in Ohio v. Roberts,128 stated that denying
one the right to confront witnesses "calls into question the ultimate
'integrity of the fact-finding process,' "1 29 this right is not absolute and
may give way to other competing interests as long as those interests are
closely examined. 30 Close examination requires that the protected hear-
say bear adequate "indicia of reliability" or at least a showing of "partic-
ularized guarantees of trustworthiness"' 13' such that "adversarial testing
would add little to its reliability."'' 3 2
Unless an out-of-court statement falls under a "firmly rooted hear-
say exception,"'133 it will be presumed unreliable and therefore inadmis-
sible for Confrontation Clause purposes. 134  On the other hand,
statements that are admitted under a firmly-rooted exception are deemed
to be so trustworthy that adversarial testing would not add to their relia-
bility. ' 35 Thus, as previously mentioned, the right to confront witnesses
is not absolute. 136 In cases involving a firmly-rooted hearsay exception,
127. Mattox, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
128. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
129. Id. at 64 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
130. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295.
131. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
132. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821 (1990).
133. Examples of firmly rooted hearsay exceptions are: present sense impression, excited
utterance, statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, records of regularly
conducted activity, learned treatises, etc. FED. R. EVID. 803.
134. Wright, 497 U.S. at 818.
135. Id. at 820-21.
136. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63. The veracity of hearsay statements is sufficiently dependable
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reliability can be inferred.
The Florida Supreme Court decided that the hearsay exception for
statements made by elderly persons is not "firmly rooted." '137 The
exception was enacted by the Florida Legislature in 1995.138 Further-
more, no other state has a similar exception that allows out-of-court
statements made by elderly victims of abuse or violence to be admit-
ted. 139 The exception is not firmly rooted because the law is new.
Therefore, the only way to admit hearsay statements falling under this
provision is to require the court to closely examine the statement, pursu-
ant to the Supreme Court's ruling in Roberts 4° If the court finds the
requisite "indicia of reliability" or at least a showing of "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness," the statement can be admitted. The lan-
guage of section 90.803(24) requires the court to look at the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the elderly person's statement to ensure
that it has safeguards of reliability and guarantees of trustworthiness.'
41
Therefore, although section 90.803(24) is not "firmly rooted," it is just
as reliable as any other evidence that could be admitted under an estab-
lished hearsay exception. Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court
ruled it unconstitutional.
C. Comparison with Child Victim Hearsay Exception,
Section 90.803(23)
The Conner court relied on past decisions regarding the hearsay
exception that deals with statements made by child victims of abuse or
neglect. 4 2 The exception for children directly precedes the exception
for elderly persons in Florida's evidence code. The language of the two
exceptions is strikingly similar. In Conner, the court stated that section
90.803(24) closely tracked the language of section 90.803(23). 143 In
to allow the untested admission of such statements against an accused when (1) "the evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or (2) it contains "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness" such that adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if anything, to the
statement's reliability. Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1894 (1999); Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
137. Conner, 748 So. 2d at 957.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
141. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24) (1995).
142. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1995).
143. Conner, 748 So. 2d at 958; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1995). The statute reads:
(23) HEARSAY EXCEPTION; STATEMENT OF CHILD VICTIM OF
SEXUAL ABUSE OR SEXUAL OFFENSE AGAINST A CHILD.-
(a) Unless the source of information or the method or circumstances by which the
statement is reported indicates a lack of trustworthiness, an out-of-court statement
made by a child victim with a physical, mental, emotional, or developmental age of
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fact, the Court directly relied on the anteceding hearsay exception in
deciding the constitutionality of section 90.803(24). However, the court
held that because section 90.803(24) does not ensure the reliability of
the hearsay statements admitted at trial and it is not supported by similar
policy interests as is the child abuse exception, the elderly exception
statute is facially violative of the defendant's constitutional right to
confrontation.'"
Although its decision was reversed by the Florida Supreme Court,
the Second District Court of Appeals had upheld the constitutionality of
section 90.803(24) by using the same analysis as applied in Perez v.
State of Florida'45 and State of Florida v. Townsend.'46 Both of these
cases were before the Florida Supreme Court, but questioned the consti-
tutionality of section 90.803(23), the hearsay exception for statements
made by child victims of abuse or neglect.
Perez was decided one year after section 90.803(23) was enacted
and involved a father who was charged with sexually abusing his three
and a half-year-old son.'47 The child's out-of-court statements-includ-
II or less describing any act of child abuse or neglect, any act of sexual abuse
against a child, the offense of child abuse, the offense of aggravated child abuse, or
any offense involving an unlawful sexual act, contact, intrusion, or penetration
performed in the presence of, with, by, or on the declarant child, not otherwise
admissible, is admissible in evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding if:
(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the
time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of
reliability. In making its determination, the court may consider the mental and
physical age and maturity of the child, the nature and duration of the abuse or
offense, the relationship of the child to the offender, the reliability of the assertion,
the reliability of the child victim, and any other factor deemed appropriate; and
(2) The child either:
a. Testifies; or
b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided that there is other corroborative evidence of
the abuse or offense. Unavailability shall include a finding by the court that the
child's participation in the trial or proceeding would result in a substantial
likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm, in addition to findings pursuant to s.
90.804(1).
(b) In a criminal action, the defendant shall be notified no later than 10 days before
the trial that a statement which qualifies as a hearsay exception pursuant to this
subsection will be offered as evidence at trial. The notice shall include a written
statement of the content of the child's statement, the time at which the statement
was made, the circumstances surrounding the statement which indicate its
reliability, and such other particulars as necessary to provide full disclosure of the
statement.
(c) The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the basis for
its ruling under this subsection.
Id.
144. Conner, 748 So. 2d at 959.
145. 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988).
146. 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994).
147. Perez, 536 So. 2d at 206.
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ing those made to his baby sister while in the bathtub and others later
made to a police officer-were admitted at trial.1 4 8 These statements
were admitted after the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and
found that the child's hearsay statements were reliable and that the child
was unavailable, pursuant to the requirements of the statute.
49
Perez challenged this decision on the grounds that, among others,
section 90.803(23) denies a defendant the opportunity to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses. 50 Additionally, Perez argued that the
factors set forth in the statute for the court's use in determining the relia-
bility of the child's statements were too vague to guarantee an accused
that the statements bear sufficient indicia of reliability. 5 ' The Florida
Supreme Court rejected all of Perez's arguments and held that section
90.803(23) is constitutional.' 52 Although the Court admitted that this
exception was not "firmly rooted," the court found that it provided suffi-
cient safeguards of reliability and guarantees of trustworthiness. 5 3 For
that reason, the court concluded that section 90.803(23) comports with
the requirements of the Confrontation Clauses of both the Florida and
U.S. Constitutions.' 54
In 1994, in Townsend, the Florida Supreme Court again reviewed
the admissibility of a child's hearsay statements in the sexual abuse con-
text.15 5 That case involved a father's conviction of sexual battery on his
two-year-old daughter in 1988.156 At trial, the state intended to intro-
duce out-of-court statements made by the child as hearsay evidence.' 57
Pursuant to the statute, the trial judge would first have to find that the
child declarant was "unavailable."'' 58 However, contrary to Perez, the
judge determined that the child was available, because she did not meet
any of the definitions of unavailability provided in the statutes.' 59 The
state appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals, which remanded
and ruled that the child was indeed unavailable. 60 After remand, the
trial judge conducted a hearing pursuant to section 90.803(23), to deter-
mine whether the hearsay statements were reliable enough to admit at
148. Id. at 211.
149. Id. at 207-08; FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1995).
150. Perez, 536 So. 2d at 208.
151. Id. at 209.
152. Id. at 211.
153. Id. at 209.
154. Id.
155. Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 951.
156. Id. at 952.
157. Id.
158. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23)(a)(2)(b) (1999).
159. Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 952.
160. Id.
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trial.' 6 ' The court's findings ultimately resulted in the admission of
most of the child's hearsay statements.'62
At trial, several witnesses testified as to the statements made by the
child regarding the alleged abuse by the child's father. 163 These wit-
nesses included a doctor and a psychologist, who provided sufficient
evidence to allow the jury to convict the defendant. 164 On appeal, the
district court found that the child's statements had been erroneously
admitted at trial, and that the defendant's rights under the Confrontation
Clause may have been violated. 165 In its decision, the district court que-
ried: does a finding of incompetency to testify because one is unable to
recognize the duty and obligation to tell the truth satisfy the legislative
"testify or be unavailable" requirement of section 90.803(23)(a)(2)? 66
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court answered this question in the
affirmative. 167
In reaching this outcome, the court discussed section 90.803(23),
which was enacted by the Florida Legislature as an attempt by both the
legislature and the courts to provide a means for admitting a child's
hearsay statements. 168 Section 90.803(23) is similar to the hearsay
exception for elderly declarants, section 90.803(24), because out-of-
court statements made by children may only be admitted after the court
has made a determination that the statement is reliable. The court rea-
soned that such a determination is necessary to avoid violating a defen-
dant's constitutional rights of confrontation and due process. 169
In order to admit a hearsay statement pursuant to this statute, the
statement must indicate trustworthiness, and the circumstances sur-
rounding the statement must provide sufficient safeguards of reliabil-
ity.' 70 Thus, the legislature ensured that the admission of a child's
statements would not be permitted absent clear indications of reliabil-
ity. 171 The dispositive issue in Townsend was whether a child's inability
to recognize the importance of the oath requirement, and the duty to tell
the truth, would render him or her incompetent to testify. 72 An individ-
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 952-53.
165. Id. at 953.
166. Id. at 952-93.
167. Id. at 960.
168. Id. at 953-54.
169. Id. at 954.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994).
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ual declared incompetent to testify is also deemed unavailable. 17 3 In
resolving this issue, the court found that a child's incapacity to under-
stand the oath requirement does not render him incompetent, but instead
renders him unavailable.' 74 Consequently, a court must still look at the
reliability of the child when making its determination of a statement's
trustworthiness.' 75 This is only one factor that should be considered
when making this determination. 17 6
The importance of ensuring the reliability and trustworthiness of an
out-of-court statement in the child victim context is the same as that in
the context of an elderly declarant. Both statutes require that the court
make a finding that the "time, content, and circumstances of the state-
ment provide sufficient safeguards of reliability."' 77 In each statute, the
legislature has provided a list of factors the court may consider when
making this finding. Although the lists are by no means exhaustive,
both suggest certain issues to consider such as the age and maturity of
the declarant, the nature and duration of the offense, the relationship of
the declarant to the offender, and the reliability of the assertion and the
declarant.'8 In Townsend, the court listed several other factors a court
may consider when looking at the totality of the circumstances surround-
ing a statement made by a child.'79 In Conner, the court held that those
factors are tailored only to the child abuse context, and could not be
extended to section 90.804(24), because no similar list could be formu-
lated in the elderly person context.'8 ° Despite the many similarities
between the two hearsay exceptions, the one regarding child declarants
was upheld, whereas the exception for elderly persons was not. This
discrepancy is solely due to the court's inability to create a similar list of
additional factors in the elderly person context as it had in the child
abuse context.
173. Id. at 956.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23)(a)(1) (1995) for other factors.
177. Id. § 90.803(24)(a)(1).
178. Id.
179. Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 957-58. These may include:
the statement's spontaneity; whether the statement was made at the first available
opportunity following the alleged incident; whether the statement was elicited in
response to questions from adults; the mental state of the child when the abuse was
reported; whether the statement consisted of a child-like description of the act;
whether the child used terminology unexpected of a child of similar age; the motive
or lack thereof to fabricate the statement; the availability of the child to distinguish
between reality and fantasy; the vagueness of the accusations; the possibility of any
improper influence on the child by participants involved in a domestic dispute; and
contradictions in the accusation.
180. Conner, 748 So. 2d at 958.
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In addition to the aforementioned distinction between the two stat-
utes, the court clearly set forth a thorough list of reasons why the hear-
say exception regarding elderly persons is distinct from that regarding
child declarants. In the concluding portion of the Conner opinion the
court began to draw these distinctions. 8' The court pointed out that the
elderly hearsay exception is much broader than the child hearsay excep-
tion because the exception applies to different types of victims.' 82 The
hearsay exception for child declarants only applies to children age
eleven or younger, whereas the hearsay exception for elderly persons
includes any adult over the age of sixty who falls under the definition of
"elderly."' 83 This class of persons is potentially much broader.
Another difference the court noted between the two exceptions is
that the child hearsay exception has greater limitations on the scope of
admissible testimony.' 84 Section 90.803(23) only allows statements
describing acts of child abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse, but section
90.803(24) allows evidence of any act of abuse or neglect, exploitation,
battery or aggravated battery, assault or aggravated assault, sexual bat-
tery, or any other violent act committed against an elderly person. 185
Thus, the hearsay exception for elderly adults applies not only to a
broader class of declarants, but also to a broader class of offenses. In
this context, evidence of an offense not nearly as violent as sexual abuse
may be admitted against a defendant, such as a mugging or pursesnatch-
ing. Thus, the permitted evidence does not necessarily have to pertain to
elder abuse, since the exception refers to a broad range of crimes not
necessarily unique to persons over the age of sixty. 86
Finally, the Conner court held that the policies which support
upholding the hearsay exception for child declarants do not exist in the
context of the elderly person exception. 87 While the child hearsay
exception was enacted in "response to the need to establish special pro-
tections for child victims in the judicial system," the court found no
equivalent justification for the elderly person exception. 8 8 In addition,
the court adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Arizona in
State v. Robinson when it held that a child's spontaneous comments are
usually more reliable than in-court testimony given months after the
event and after many interviews and interrogations that may have dis-
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 959.
188. Id.
[Vol. 55:309
NARROWING THE GAP
torted the child's memory. 89 Therefore, the court seems to imply that
an out-of-court statement by an elderly person made at or near the time
of the offense is less reliable than one made several months later, in
court. The implication is that the elderly person may fabricate some
details of the event immediately after it occurred. This argument does
not seem rationally based on the legislature's initial intent when it
enacted the statute-to protect elderly persons from being re-victimized
by their assailants.
The court concludes by offering an apology for the impact its hold-
ing may have, by stating that "[w]hile we as a court, condemn in the
strongest terms acts of exploitation or violence committed against per-
sons who are elderly, any state interest in prosecuting crimes against the
elderly cannot constitutionally justify the abrogation of a defendant's
most basic constitutional right."' 190 It is apparent that the court recog-
nizes that it essentially conducted a balancing test between the impor-
tance of prosecuting crimes against the elderly and the importance of an
accused's rights of confrontation. Here, the rights of the accused pre-
vailed. Nevertheless, in analyzing section 90.803(24) along the same
lines as the child abuse hearsay exception, the court could have easily
resulted in a different outcome. If it had only viewed the elderly in the
same sympathetic manner as it did children, the same justifications
would have been able to support the constitutionality of the elderly per-
son exception.
III. ANALYSIS
Conner v. State of Florida leaves many unanswered questions. By
quashing the district court's opinion, the Florida Supreme Court over-
turned Conner's conviction. As a result, a crime was committed against
Ford and the assailant was not punished for it. If Conner did not commit
the crime, he should not have been convicted for it just for the sake of
vindicating Ford. Nevertheless, the hearsay statements ought to have
been admitted as one piece of evidence to assist the jury in finding out
who perpetrated the crime.
The court based its reasoning on the grounds that admitting Ford's
out-of-court statements regarding the crime would eviscerate Conner's
constitutional rights of confrontation.' 9' Has the court forgotten its anal-
ysis of the purpose of confrontation and the exceptions which admit
hearsay evidence? The answer seems to be that the court has. The
lower court's decision and the Florida Supreme Court's reasoning in
189. Id. (quoting State of Arizona v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 804 (Ariz. 1987).
190. Id. at 960.
191. Id.
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upholding section 90.803(23) reveal inconsistencies in the Conner opin-
ion. Clearly imbedded in section 90.803(24) are the provisions which
would allow admitting the evidence resulting in the defendant being
unable to confront it. Nevertheless, the court finds justifications in hold-
ing that these same provisions which helped support the hearsay excep-
tion for child declarants do not apply to the hearsay exception for elderly
persons.
Had the statute not been overturned, it is still uncertain as to
whether or not Ford's out-of-court statements would have been admit-
ted. Under a narrow interpretation of the statute and the definition of
"elderly person," a strict court may still have excluded this evidence.
Although Ford was certainly an elderly person who suffered from some
of the infirmities of aging, he still lived alone and cared for himself.
Under the definition of "elderly," the signs of aging must reach the
extent that the ability of the person to provide adequately for his own
care or protection is impaired. Although this definition has not been
challenged on grounds of vagueness, it does not clearly define what
"adequate" means. Thus, a narrow court may find that since 84-year-old
Ford cared and provided for himself, he is not an elderly person under
the statute and the hearsay exception would not apply to him. As a
result, someone in Ford's position would probably have been forced to
testify and face his assailant. Nevertheless, it seems evident that a better
outcome could have been reached in this case. An alternative outcome
would better serve justice by accommodating the declarant's unavaila-
bility, submitting the hearsay evidence, and at the same time being care-
ful not to violate a defendant's right to confrontation. The next section
proposes such an alternative.
IV. A RECONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 90.803(24)
Conner's arguments have some merit. There are gaps in the lan-
guage of section 90.803(24) suggesting that the statute may not have
been tailored narrowly enough. Although the language of section
90.803(24) closely tracks the language of section 90.803(23), the legisla-
ture may not have fully taken into consideration the fact that the two
sections apply to different groups of people. This distinction was essen-
tial to the statute's survival and the legislature's failure to recognize this
resulted in the statute being overturned. The unfortunate consequence of
this is that the state of Florida no longer has a hearsay exception for the
admission of out-of-court statements made by abused or neglected eld-
erly persons.
The Conner court does not explain the implication of its decision
on future cases. Yet the implication is clear. No longer will an elderly
[Vol. 55:309
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person be excused from testifying in court, regardless of whether he will
suffer physical, mental, or emotional harm. But what of an elderly per-
son who suffers abuse or neglect, and then dies before the case goes to
trial? That person does not have a choice whether or not to testify, and
does not consider whether facing his assailant in court would be too
severe of an experience for him to bear. That person cannot confront his
assailant, cannot point his finger at the defendant and tell the jury that
their duty is to convict that person. Because his testimony is inadmissi-
ble, he will never know justice. His survivors will never have the satis-
faction of knowing that the assailant has been rightfully condemned.
With no other evidence or witnesses to the crime, the defendant will be
exonerated. Thus, the outcome of Conner contradicts a long-established
legal objective. As stated in Mattox in 1895, "[t]o say that a criminal,
• . . should go scot free simply because death has closed the mouth of
that witness, would be carrying his constitutional protection to an
unwarrantable extent."' 92 The Florida Supreme Court should have been
wary of this result, and attempted to reconstruct the statute so as to
avoid this outcome.
The first area which must be addressed in order to revise section
90.803(24), is the definition of an elderly person, section 825.101 of the
Laws of Florida. An elderly person is defined as an individual at least
sixty years old "who is suffering from the infirmities of aging as mani-
fested by advanced age or organic brain damage, or other physical,
mental, or emotional dysfunctioning, to the extent that the ability of the
person to provide adequately for his own care or protection is
impaired." '93 This definition has been criticized as being overbroad
when used in the hearsay context. The elderly hearsay exception poten-
tially applies to any person over the age of sixty. By raising the age
minimum in the definition to at least that of the retirement age, the eld-
erly exception will be applicable to a smaller group of people. Other-
wise, many people who are not ordinarily considered elderly could
invoke this provision in order to stay out of court.
The definition of "elderly person" can also been criticized because
parts of it are irrelevant. Why is it important that a person is considered
elderly only if his "dysfunctioning" impairs the ability to provide ade-
quately for his own care or protection? Many people, including those
over the age of sixty live alone. Some care for themselves adequately
and some do not. But, there are varying degrees of adequacy, and one is
not required to live up to the standards that another person lives by.
Nevertheless, one's care or protection has little relevance to being con-
192. Mattox, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
193. Ch. 95-158, §§ 1, 2 at 1587-89, Laws of Fla.
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sidered elderly or to a person's ability to testify in court. Although sec-
tion 825.101 is the standard definition of "elderly person" used in the
state of Florida, when it applies to an evidentiary rule such as section
90.803(24) it should be subjected to greater scrutiny.
Therefore, section 90.803(24) should include a separate clause
defining "elderly person" specifically for the context of hearsay state-
ments. Instead of cross-referencing to the definition of "elderly person"
in section 825.101, this independent definition should exclude unneces-
sary verbiage while including other, necessary provisions. Moreover,
having a separate definition of "elderly person" for use in the hearsay
context will eliminate the necessity of rewriting the general definition,
and will avoid the impact this revision might have on other areas of the
law that depend on that definition.
A suggested definition for "elderly person," as applicable in the
case of an elder victim wishing to utilize a hearsay protection, is as fol-
lows: "A person at least over the age of 65 who is suffering from the
infirmities of aging as manifested by advanced age or organic brain
damage, or other physical, mental, or emotional impairment, to the
extent that the ability to provide for his own care or protection may be
impaired, but not to the extent that one's ability to perceive events and to
process and relay information is adversely affected." If this definition
had existed in a hypothetical version of Ford's case in which he was
alive, there would be no challenge to Ford's invocation of this
exception.
Section 90.803(24) was criticized not only for involving a broader
class of declarants than section 90.803(23), but also because it involves
a broader class of offenses. In order to argue that section 90.803(24)
should be upheld for the same reasons as section 90.803(23), the statutes
must be as similar as possible. Yet, although the child hearsay exception
allows evidence describing any act of child abuse, neglect, or child sex-
ual abuse, the elderly hearsay exception allows evidence of a much
wider range of offenses. These include abuse, neglect, exploitation, bat-
tery, assault, sexual battery, or "any other violent act on the declarant
elderly person."' 9 4 The offenses within the child context predominately
apply to sexual abuse or neglect, whereas the offenses applicable to the
elder context apply to essentially any violent act.
However, it is difficult to omit some of the offenses listed in sec-
tion 90.803(24) because that would contradict the very purpose, of the
statute. It would be difficult to determine which offenses are more
important than others, which to keep and which to omit. In the child
194. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a) (1995).
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context, an assault or battery is considered abuse. The state would not
charge an adult with battery against a child, but instead would charge
that person with child abuse. Yet, a battery against an elderly person is
not considered abuse, because adults are not given the same protections
from harm as children are. Consequently, the only way to rephrase the
statute so that it does not seem to apply to an overly broad range of
offenses would be to eliminate the phrase which includes "any other
violent act." This tightens the language of the statute to include only
those acts of elder abuse or neglect, assault, or battery. These are more
narrowly tailored to the elder abuse context.
After stating the threshold requirements that the declarant must be
an elderly victim of one of the stated offenses, the statute goes on to
describe the process of ascertaining whether the out-of-court statement
made by the elderly victim is sufficiently reliable. 195 As previously
stated, the statute lists many factors the court may consider during a
hearing conducted out of the presence of the jury. 19 6 A similar list is
provided in the child declarant hearsay exception.1 97 In fact, an addi-
tional list of factors was created by the Florida Supreme Court in State v.
Townsend.198 However, no additional list was extended to the elder
declarant context. Therefore, Conner argues that the language of the
statute is not strict enough, because it states "the court may"'19 9 and not
"the court must." Consequently, it neither mandates the court to con-
sider the listed factors, nor to consider any additional factors.
The determination as to whether the out-of-court statement is relia-
ble is conducted out of the jury's presence."° Although this hearing is
required by statute, the substance of the hearing is not regulated. By
including some guidance as to how a judge is to decide whether an out-
of-court statement is sufficiently reliable and trustworthy to use in court,
the statute could avoid any criticism that it allows a judge to abuse his
discretion. Therefore, in revising section 90.803(24), Conner's sugges-
tion should be adopted. He recommended amending the statute to man-
date the court to consider the factors listed in the statute, because it
would "provide sufficient 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness'
or 'safeguards of reliability' as to be so trustworthy and reliable that
adversarial testing would add little."'20' Although the Florida Supreme
Court did not create an additional list of factors to be used in the elder
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1995).
198. 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994).
199. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)(1) (1995) (emphasis added).
200. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24) (1995).
201. See Initial Brief of Petitioner at 26.
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hearsay exception, it would not be necessary if the court was required to
consider the factors already in place.
The statute already incorporates a check on its use. That is, once a
statement has been determined reliable and trustworthy, it is only used in
court if there is other corroborating evidence of the offense.2 °2 There-
fore, if Conner's case went to trial and the state was granted permission
to use Ford's out-of-court statements, there would have to be other evi-
dence of the crime as well. In this case, other evidence existed, such as
the condition of Ford's house after the incident and a telephone which
was recovered after the event. 20 3 However, the Second District Court of
Appeals only considered this evidence to be corroborative of the state-
ment.2° The statute specifically states that there must be corroborative
evidence of the abuse or offense. 205 A court should be careful to deter-
mine that the supporting evidence is independent of the hearsay state-
ment. This is critical to ensure that section 90.803(24) in no way
abrogates a defendant's confrontation rights.
The statute requires that the elderly person be found unavailable to
testify in order to be protected by section 90.803(24).206 In order to be
considered unavailable, the declarant elderly person must prove to the
court that harm would result if he participated in the trial.207 Absent this
finding, the declarant would not be exempted from taking the stand. The
statute states, "unavailability shall include a finding by the court that the
elderly person's ... participation in the trial or proceeding would result
in a substantial likelihood of severe emotional, mental, or physical
harm. 20 8 Thus, although it appears that a broad range of excuses is
allowed to prove unavailability, the exception requires that the likeli-
hood of harm be substantial and the harm itself severe. Although it may
seem that the declarant would be easily excused because he may assert
many reasons as to why he is unavailable, he must first meet a high
standard of proof.
The child hearsay exception has a similar, yet more limited provi-
sion requiring the declarant be found unavailable, and that the court
should find that "the child's participation ... would result in a substan-
tial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm. °20 9 Although section
90.803(24) closely tracks the language of section 90.803(23), instead of
202. FLA. STAT. § 90,803(24) (1995).
203. Conner, 709 So. 2d at 172.
204. Id.
205. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24) (1995).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1995).
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having to prove either emotional or mental harm, an elderly person may
also use the excuse of physical harm to avoid testifying in court.2"'
While it is understandable why the legislature may have added this third
factor, it results in the statute being overbroad. Although an elderly per-
son may have physical handicaps that a child does not, this impairment
has nothing to do with an ability to testify in court. The fact that an
elderly person uses a wheelchair or walker should not excuse him from
testifying in court.
The only time that a showing of physical harm should excuse an
elderly person from testifying in court is when the physical handicap
already exists, making it physically impossible for that person to get to
court. For example, if the elderly person is bedridden or immobile, he
should be exempted from testifying. The court should, however, use a
case specific approach when granting these exemptions. By requiring an
existing physical harm, the statute would not protect a larger group of
people than intended. In this way, the language of the can statute can be
narrowed.
One possible revision or the relevant portion of the statute would
be: "unavailability shall include a finding by the court that the elderly
person's participation in the trial or proceeding would result in a sub-
stantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm, or that the eld-
erly person has a physical handicap which prevents him from being
transported to court to testify." This restructures the statute so that it
more closely resembles the child hearsay exception, while recognizing
that it deals with a different class of declarants altogether. With proof of
a substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm, the court
will not require the elderly person to testify. Moreover, proof of a per-
son's physical limitations will also allow that person to avoid testifying
in court. Without these sound excuses, the declarant should not be
deemed unavailable.
Lastly, an important way to align the two statutes so that section
90.803(24) is reenacted on policy grounds, as section 90.803(23) was
held constitutional, is to look at each section's policy interests. The
child hearsay exception was enacted in response to the need to establish
special protections for child victims in the judicial system. Similarly,
the elderly hearsay exception was designed to insure that elderly victims
will not suffer injustice at the hands of the legal system. In essence,
these policies are the same.
A child victim of abuse or neglect may have severe emotional or
mental harm as a result of the abuse for the rest of his life, but there is
210. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24) (1995).
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also the possibility of a similar result in an elderly person. Some have
argued that a child has his entire life still ahead of him, whereas the
elderly person does not. However, although a child may suffer great
harm from testifying in court and facing the alleged perpetrator again, so
too might an elderly person. Just as the state has an interest in protect-
ing child victims of abuse from the further trauma that would be caused
by forcing them to testify in court,2 ' the state has a similar interest in
protecting elderly victims of abuse. The state should not turn its back on
the elders of the community with the assumption that an elderly person
can deal with the trauma of facing his perpetrator better than a child.
There ought to be greater protection for those who are considered more
vulnerable as a result of their age or stage in life whether very young or
very old. Restructuring and reenacting the elderly person hearsay
exception would again provide this protection.
Thus, the reconstruction of section 90.803(24) should be as
follows:
(24) HEARSAY EXCEPTION: STATEMENT OF ELDERLY PER-
SON.-
(a) Unless the source of information or the method or circumstances
by which the statement is reported indicates a lack of trustworthiness,
an out-of-court statement made by an elderly person, as defined in
subsection (d), describing any act of abuse or neglect, any act of
exploitation, the offense of battery or aggravated battery or assault or
aggravated assault or sexual battery on the declarant elderly person,
not otherwise admissible, is admissible in evidence in any civil or
criminal proceeding if:
1. The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the
jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement pro-
vide sufficient safeguards of reliability. In making its determination,
the court must consider the mental and physical age and maturity of
the elderly person, the nature and duration of the abuse or offense, the
relationship of the victim to the offender, the reliability of the asser-
tion, the reliability of the elderly person, and other factors deemed
appropriate; and
2. The elderly person either:
a. Testifies; or
b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided there is corroborative evi-
dence of the abuse or offense. Unavailability shall include a finding
by the court that the elderly person's participation in the trial or pro-
ceeding would result in a substantial likelihood of severe emotional
or mental harm, or that the elderly person has a physical handicap
which prevents them from being transported to court to testify, in
addition to findings pursuant to s. 90.804(1).
211. Gladening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212, 217 (Fla. 1988).
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(b) In a criminal action, the defendant shall be notified no later than
10 days before the trial that a statement which qualifies as a hearsay
exception pursuant to this subsection will be offered as evidence at
trial. The notice shall include a written statement of the content of
the elderly person's statement, the time at which the statement was
made, the circumstances surrounding the statement which indicate its
reliability, and such other particulars as necessary to provide full dis-
closure of the statement.
(c) The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to
the basis for its ruling under this subsection.
(d) As pertains to this statute, an elderly person is one over the age of
65 who is suffering from the infirmities of aging as manifested by
advanced age or organic brain damage, or other physical, mental, or
emotional impairment, to the extent that the ability to provide for his
own care or protection may be impaired, but not to the extent that
one's ability to perceive events and to process and relay information
is adversely affected.
V. CONCLUSION
When the legislature enacted section 90.803(24), it intended to pro-
tect a class of people more susceptible to harm than others. Unfortu-
nately, the Conner case resulted in the statute being overturned and, as a
consequence, there is no longer a necessary exception for elderly victims
of abuse.2' 2 In overruling the statute, the Florida Supreme Court real-
ized that the impact on future cases is great.2 13 However, the opinion
does not make clear whether the court even considered restructuring the
statute so that it could be deemed constitutional. Surely, the court did
not want to free a guilty man, but it also could not justify depriving an
individual of his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him.
If no statute existed which allowed the admission of out-of-court
statements, then the court's decision would be justified. Legal history
demonstrates that a defendant's right of confrontation is not absolute,
and bows to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial
process.21 4 Furthermore, the child hearsay exception has been upheld.
Therefore, the court's argument that the elderly person hearsay excep-
tion cannot be upheld because it abrogates the defendant's right to con-
frontation does not hold much weight. If the court was concerned that it
not deprive individuals of their constitutional rights, then it should have
attempted to restructure the statute bearing this in mind.
The suggestions given in this note serve to accommodate these
212. Conner, 748 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1999).
213. Id.
214. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
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goals. By narrowing the gap between the reasons why section
90.803(23) was upheld and section 90.803(24) was overturned, the eld-
erly person hearsay exception should be able to survive the court's scru-
tiny. Section 90.803(24) should be rewritten in language even more
similar to section 90.803(23). That, in addition to the similar policy
interests for each statute, should leave no room for distinctions to be
made between the two exceptions. As a consequence, there could be no
legal justification for upholding one statute, and not the other.
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